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Abstract
Terrorism and radicalized political groups are an ever-growing subsection of the
American and international news cycles. Mainstream media outlets tend to focus on the
atrocious actions of terrorists, leaving the American public without a true understanding
of what encourages someone to become a violent, radicalized extremist. This paper
intends to investigate possible psychological factors that can predict a person’s likelihood
to become radicalized and participate in a salafi jihadi terrorist campaign. If such
psychological conditions exist, perhaps they are the key to preventing radicalization in
the first place, and in turn, the key to preventing any terrorist activity. What other factors
motivate someone to partake in terrorist activities? How can counterterrorism strategies
distinguish between those who merely feel animosity towards the West and those who are
indoctrinated to devote their lives to the West’s demise?
While the concept of terrorism is by no means a new one, modern events have
provided new opportunities for research and study. Beginning with the World Trade
Center attacks of September 11th, 2001, we see a new era of terrorism in which Al Qaeda
and its affiliates are able to recruit, train, and produce armies of radicalized fighters in
record time, making the fight against terrorism an increasingly difficult one. By studying
these modern examples of terrorism and combining this research with the behavioral
sciences, we can gain some insight into the mind of a terrorist and the process by which
organizations are able to meet the psychological needs of their recruits.
Previous research has concluded that almost all terrorists, including salafi jihadi
extremists, do not suffer from any abnormal psychological conditions, as terrorist
organizations extensively screen participants for any instability that may threaten their
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mission. However, many terrorists do report feelings of doubt, persecution, and
insecurity; these emotions are important in the framing of a terrorist cell’s rhetoric to gain
new members. Abnormal psychopathology is not an accurate predictor of one’s potential
to become a radical, violent Islamist extremist. Psychological factors, such as the quest
for significance and identity, are very influential in prompting someone to interact with
extremist groups. The manner in which terrorist organizations communicate with the
public and their potential recruits is the defining variable that can determine to likelihood
of radicalization. In turn, counterterrorism strategy must be focused upon dismantling the
image that extremist groups project to the public and providing alternative options for
those interested in joining a group to fulfill their psychological needs.
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Introduction
Arguably the most defining feature of this century’s political and global affairs
atmosphere, terrorism grows in significance every day. The events of September 11th,
2001 have shaped subsequent presidential elections, international relations, and have
even prompted the creation of an entire federal department. These events have also
triggered an interdisciplinary response and a desire to prevent future international
terrorism threats. Areas ranging from psychology and sociology to criminal justice and
law enforcement are involved in the “war on terror,” but it seems that most efforts to
contain the culture of radicalization are in vain; some scholars liken al-Qaeda and its
affiliates to “the mythical hydra that could grow multiple heads in place of those that
were chopped off… able to spring branches around the globe in response to strikes by the
United States and its allies that deal its defeats.” (Kruglanski et al., 2014, p. 70) Despite
extensive research, interrogation, and investigation, experts have yet to crack the code on
how to stop terrorism in its tracks and improve global security.
In order to eradicate salafi jihadi terrorism, it is essential to understand what
motivates terrorists to act; it is therefore important to understand the process of
radicalization, which prompts terrorists to use violence to achieve their political goals.
Are certain people more prone to radicalization? Do terrorists share a common
psychological trait or disorder? How do salafi jihadi groups manage to recruit so many to
their cause? Do culture and social psychology play a role in creating terrorists? All of
these questions have been addressed in previous research and studies, the results of which
will help determine the most probable reason for radicalization and the best approach to
counterterrorism.
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Defining “Terrorism”
A recent spike has been seen in the occurrence of terrorist activity and attacks,
specifically in Salafi jihadi terrorism, but political violence is by no means a new
concept. In fact, it has existed for hundreds of years, its definition fluctuating with
generational and cultural differences. Crenshaw (1981) provides an early definition of
terrorism:
The term terrorism was coined to describe the systematic inducement of fear and
anxiety to control and direct a civilian population, and the phenomenon of
terrorism as a challenge to the authority of the state grew from the difficulties
revolutionaries experienced in trying to recreate the mass uprisings of the French
Revolution. (p. 380)
Modern definitions of terrorism have been streamlined to include various parts, which
Schouten (2010) lists as: ““(a) the use of force or violence (b) by individuals or groups
(c) that is directed toward civilian populations (d) and intended to instill fear (e) as a
means of coercing individuals or groups to change their political or social positions.” (p.
369) The definition that will be utilized throughout this paper comes from Title 22 of the
United States Code §2b56f(d) and defines terrorism as: “politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience.” (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 170)
Defining “Radicalization”
Another key aspect of terrorism is radicalization, a process that is complex and
can vary among different geographical areas and cultures. Since it is an adjustable
process, radicalization may be just as difficult to define as terrorism. Helfstein (2012)
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simplifies the definition of radicalization to be: “the process by which people come to
adopt extremist political beliefs with a particular emphasis on those ideologies that
encourage violent action.” (p.6) This violent behavior challenges and demoralizes what
matters to the general population; for example, radical behavior such as crime challenges
the safety of others.
Further discussion of radicalization, its process, and its motivations can be found
later in this paper. We can now turn to the current literature available on this topic to
outline what is already known about terrorist psychology. The next section will
investigate different research studies and will discuss their findings within the context of
this paper’s hypothesis- that psychological needs prompt seekers to interact with Islamist
extremist groups and the propaganda said groups employ are the defining variable that
leads to potential Islamist extremists.

Literature Review: Specific Studies of Terrorist Psychology
Now that basic definitions of both terrorism and radicalization have been
provided, we can turn to relevant theories and examples surrounding the psychological
perspective of this phenomenon. It is important to note that the following examples are
global in nature; they extend far past the American political sphere and conflicts that our
country has been involved in. However, they cannot fully capture the scale of terrorism,
as this technique has been used in all parts of the world for many years, and will likely
continue as such without proper intervention techniques.
An interesting article that examines the psychology of terrorism and radicalization
offers first-hand insight into the treatment of psychiatric patients who were involved in
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terrorist campaigns. Written by Lord Alderdice, a psychiatrist, psychotherapist, leader of
a political party, and Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly, this piece suggests
taking a more “psychologically sophisticated way[s] of addressing the problem of
terrorism.” (Lord Alderdice, 2007, p. 201) The Lord spent his childhood in Northern
Ireland throughout very violent days of terrorism. He states that despite popular
allegations that terrorists are “psychologically disturbed,” there are actually very few
members with severe psychosis as they present a “high risk” for terrorist organizations.
(Lord Alderdice, 2007, p. 201) However, his research has found that those who suffer
from “sociopathic personality disorder” and do successfully enter a terrorist cell often
break away and form their own branch of the organization as a result of intergroup
arguments. The article supports the argument that more mental illness occurs after
involvement with a terrorist organization than beforehand:
Relatively few individuals who are directly involved in terrorism come along
for psychological treatment. Those who do, tend to appear at the clinic when they
are no longer actively involved. Some are suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder, which is by definition a set of symptoms that developed as a result of
violent experiences rather than a pre-disposing factor to involvement. (Lord
Alderdice, 2007, p. 201)
Later discussions of group and social psychology will offer other hypotheses of
motivational factors for terrorism.
While terrorism in Northern Ireland has a place in the dialogue of terrorism and
its motivational factors, there is no doubt that Islamic extremism is currently the most
discussed type of terrorism in academic literature, and is also the primary focus of this

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM AND RADICALIZATION 8

paper. Indonesian Islamic terrorism is discussed in an article from The Asian Journal of
Social Psychology. Author A. W. Kruglanski (2013) offers another take on the
relationship between psychological factors and the likelihood of becoming a radicalized
terrorist, arguing that group dynamics and social psychology play a far larger role than
individual mental illness:
…through social networks the individual is exposed to an influence process
whereby he or she ultimately gets persuaded and ends up adopting the way of
thinking and the world view of the network… it is such an influence process that
is critical and does not require an extensive network of interconnections with
radically minded individuals. (p. 115)
Helfstein (2012) reinforces this concept, stating: “While the affect of social relationships
may be limited in the awareness stage, they can be crucial as people continue down the
pathway towards radical activity.” (p. 20) Marc Sageman also references this theory in
his article, “A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists.” He states that
natural group dynamics lead to the escalation of ideals, making radicalization much more
likely: “…groups acted as echo chambers, amplifying their grievances, intensifying the
members' bonds to each other… Their turn to violence and the terrorist movement was a
collective decision, not an individual one.” (Sageman, 2008a, p. 227)
The current relevant theories on this topic suggest that group psychology may
outweigh individual psychology in its influence upon the process of radicalization to
violent behavior. Mental illness is not a predictive quality of radicalization, nor is relative
economic conditions alone, as further discussion will demonstrate. There are also many
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assumptions regarding the type of person that is most likely to engage in violent acts of
terrorism, the majority of which have been proven to be false via prior research studies.
Common Myths of the Characteristics of Extremists
The first assumption about potential Islamist extremists is one that has already
been discussed and can be reinforced further- that upon entering into the process of
radicalization, the recruit is not mentally unstable. Venhaus (2010) states that while their
actions may appear crazy to outsiders, no mental illness can be attributed to their choices:
“After the radicalization and indoctrination process, his actions may appear utterly insane
and irrational to an outside observer, but the young person who entered the process was
mentally stable.” (p. 4)
Next, it is important to note that economic profiles are not good indicators of
whether or not someone will join a terrorist cell. While poor economic conditions can
exacerbate feelings of injustice and distrust in government, they do not necessarily
prompt someone to commit violent acts of terrorism: “Available evidence suggests that
individuals are more likely to commit property crimes if they have lower wages or less
education. The occurrence of violent crimes, including murders, however, is typically
found to be unrelated to economic opportunities.” (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002, p. 7)
This statement can be applied to terrorism, since it is a very specialized form of violent
crime with very specific motivations. However, economic conditions may be a predictor
of violence at the national level, but should be distinguished from an individual
motivator:
While economic deprivation may not be associated with participation in terrorism
and politically motivated violence at the individual level, it may nonetheless
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matter at the national level. For example, if a country is impoverished, a minority
of the relatively well off in that country may turn to terrorism to seek to improve
conditions of their countrymen. (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002, p. 30)
Another assumption that has proven to be false about the majority of al-Qaeda recruits
and other potential Islamist extremists is that they have a deeply held understanding of
their Muslim faith. In fact, in a study of individuals who are “foreign fighters” for alQaeda, the majority was not exposed to in-depth religious teachings and since they did
not fully understand their religion, they were more susceptible to misguiding by their
superiors in religiously-motivated extremist groups. (Venhaus, 2010, p. 5) Although they
may not fully understand it, their religion becomes an integral part of their collective
identity. These extremists will eventually identify more with being a Muslim than with
any other characteristic of themselves, allowing for terrorist groups to use religion as an
influence in recruitment.
In summary, Marc Sageman (2008a) offers a concise description of what does not
influence radicalization to salafi jihadi terrorism:
Contrary to popular belief, radicalization into terrorism is not the product of
poverty, various forms of brainwashing, youth, ignorance or lack of education,
lack of employment, lack of social responsibility, criminality, or mental illness.
The mobilization of young people into this violent social movement is based on
friendship and kinship. (p. 224)
If mental illness, relative economic conditions, and a deep understanding of Muslim faith
are not sufficient conditions for predicting potential radicalization, the way in which
extremist groups communicate with potential recruits must be a highly influential factor.
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Psychological needs, such as the desires for community, identity, purpose, and security,
motivate potential extremists to interact with terrorist groups, by which process they are
exposed to a seemingly legitimate way to suit their needs. The following section of this
paper will examine the hypothesis that the potential for radicalization is dependent upon
seeking fulfillment of some psychological need, which is met with a response of proper
propaganda, presentation, and group psychology within the Salafi jihadi community.

Hypotheses and Model: Relationships among Variables
After reviewing the literature that pertains to this research topic, we can clearly
see that the relationship between mental illness and the likelihood of becoming a
radicalized terrorist is relatively nonexistent. As Post et al. describe, “terrorist groups
attempt to screen out mentally disturbed recruits- after all, they present a security risk.”
(2009, p. 14) Therefore, the academic community has concluded that mental illness is not
a significant factor in the psychological motivations of terrorists, and as such, other
variables must impact this trend more.
It appears, then, that the motivating factors to utilize terrorism to achieve political
goals come not from the individual’s psychological instability, but rather from their
innate psychological needs and internalizing the ideology of the group or movement.
Terrorist organizations can use these needs to their advantage and offer recruits ways to
meet their needs for community and purpose, while framing their mission as an honorable
one that will alleviate some of the hardships one might suffer. These hardships can
include family instability, widespread conflict in their country, and a lack of career
direction. It is important to note that while national conflict may influence economics,
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personal economic deprivation has been proven to not be influential upon one’s
likelihood of joining a terrorist organization and becoming a radicalized extremist.
The following section of this paper will explore other motivations for terrorism
and radicalization, including group dynamics and social psychological factors. By
examining previous research by experts in the field, preventative measures will also be
discussed and will center on combating these specific motivational factors. The
conversation will be structured in terms of dependent variables (likelihood of becoming a
radicalized salafi jihadi terrorist) and independent variables (propaganda and framing
from terrorist groups and the exploitation of recruits’ psychological needs). I hypothesize
that the manner in which terrorist organizations communicate with their recruits, via
propaganda, framing, and the exploitation of psychological needs, is the most influential
variable in creating salafi jihadi extremists and terrorists. As recruits interact with a
terrorist group, I believe that their chance of joining said group and becoming a
radicalized terrorist increases because they are persuaded by what the group can offer
them. I hope to present a clear delineation of the process of radicalization specific to
salafi jihadi extremists and offer a method of counterterrorism strategy focused on
redefining how potential Islamist extremists attempt to fulfill their psychological needs.
After analysis, the best course of action to reduce the risk of radicalization will be
presented and this paper’s hypothesis will be supported or refuted.

Research Design: Potential Factors and Preventative Measures
In order to measure the previously outlined variables, a variety of scholarly
articles will be cited and analyzed. These articles focus on interdisciplinary approaches to
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understanding the concept of terrorism and the process of radicalization. Authors range
from psychiatrists and psychologists to experts in intelligence and the law enforcement
aspect of counterterrorism. While there is a wide breadth of information on this topic
because of its growing importance, there are also limitations to one’s research abilities. It
is sometimes difficult to obtain first-hand accounts of a specific terrorist’s psychological
state since many still remain at large or have died during their time in a terrorist cell. One
should be cautious of generalization about violent extremists; assuming that there is one
profile for a terrorist that fits all discounts the differing dynamics that influence the
process of becoming a terrorist in the first place. (Horgan, 2008, p. 84) By taking a
qualitative approach, common themes among the available information can be outlined to
draw conclusions regarding this paper’s hypothesis, that Islamist extremist groups
successfully frame their missions to fit the psychological needs for identity and
community among potential recruits.
Group Dynamics and Cultural Norms
Of the many various disciplines involved in the “war on terror” and invested in
understanding how to successfully halt the process of radicalization, the behavioral
sciences aim to determine what specifically makes a person “susceptible to recruitment”
by terrorist organizations. (Schouten, 2010, p. 371) Schouten (2010) argues “a focus on
group and organizational dynamics, rather than individual psychology,” to explain
terrorist behavior. (p. 373) This approach also emphasizes questioning how one becomes
a terrorist, rephrasing the usual question of why someone uses terrorism. (p. 373) He cites
a study in which Middle Eastern terrorists were interviewed regarding their motives and
concludes:
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The most important influence was group behavior: individuals joined their
respective terrorist movements because “everybody was doing it.” Incarceration
with fellow members of the group and like-minded individuals increased their
exposure and commitment to the group and its goals. (p. 374)
Research from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point supports this theory,
stating that: “There are very few people who progress to violent action in
isolation…Many radicals have a history of social contact or reaching out to develop
relationships with like-minded individuals.” (Helfstein, 2012, p. 3) Like anyone else,
terrorists seek out information from their peers regarding beliefs and behaviors, but it is
when the terrorist group has “a clearly defined chain of authority” that articulates their
mission “clearly and unanimously” that greatly influences the new recruits’ attitudes and
fosters the creation of new beliefs and identities. (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p.170)
Pressure from the group or organization also impacts the tendency of one to
engage in acts of suicide terrorism: “this process of change is the result of interactions
among individual/personal experiences such as trauma and humiliation, social or
ideological reasons, and social or organizational pressures.” (Schouten, 2010, p. 376) The
growing trend of suicide terrorism suggests that a strong influence from peers is
predictive of violent activity, says Schouten:
Terrorism is a form of targeted, rather than impulsive, violence. While the latter is
more commonly associated with major mental illness, the former is more likely to
be associated with group dynamics and personality characteristics, although more
significant mental illness can be a risk factor, especially in the case of lone actors.
(2010, p. 375)
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However, this is not to say that suicide terrorists do not internalize the ideology that their
respective terrorist group presents. Post and colleagues explore this concept further in
their 2009 article, “The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism”: “Collective identity and the
group and social processes that consolidate that collective identity play a crucial role both
in leading Muslim youth onto the path of terrorism and in reframing suicide as
martyrdom.” (p. 19) The idea of martyrdom, they argue, is such an integral part of
Muslim culture that the value of suicidal violence is taught from an early age. Assaf
Moghadam (2008) suggests that martyrdom is a successful tactic of persuasion and that
“individuals and organizations will employ suicide terrorism if they are likely to enjoy
social support for this tactic.” (p. 53) Promises of rewards in the afterlife as well as the
threat of humiliation from fellow group members if such a path is declined essentially
forces young recruits to value the goals of the group more than their own lives. (Post et
al, 2009, p. 19) This type of group psychology is incredibly effective among adolescents,
who tend to listen less to their parents and more to outside sources, such as charismatic
members of terrorist organizations. A “culture of martyrdom” paired with the
vulnerability of impressionable young minds creates an endless supply of willing
participants, thus making group psychology one of the most influential factors of violent
extremism, specifically of suicide terrorism. (Post et al., 2009, p. 24) This “culture of
martyrdom” resonates with the collective identity of both the nation they live in and with
the terrorist group which potential extremists join. More discussion of collective identity
can be found in the following sections.
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The Quest for Significance
Another motivation for salafi jihadi terrorism, as scholars argue, is the presence of
the “quest for significance.” Kruglanski and colleagues (2014) explore this theory in their
article, “The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest
Impacts Violent Extremism.” This quest can have motivations that are culture-specific,
but share characteristics which “constitute a major, universal, human motivation
variously labeled as the need for esteem, achievement, meaning, competence, control,
and so on.” (Kruglanski et al., 2014, p. 73) While specific terrorists have their own
specific goals, most include “honor, vengeance, religion, loyalty to the leader, perks in
the afterlife, even feminism.” (Kruglanski et al., 2014, p. 73) These goals of terrorism are
part of general human needs for “esteem, achievement, meaning, competence, control,
and so on.” (Kruglanski et al., 2014, p. 73) It can be assumed, then, that people who
commit radical behavior are seeking one of the previously outlined psychological human
needs. They may adapt their morality to suit this behavior and may place these needs
above any other, making radical behavior the means by which to achieve their main goal,
whether personal or political.
The desire for significance can be awakened in a variety of ways, including a
previous loss of significance or a prior humiliation, the anticipation of a future loss of
significance or the threat of future humiliation, and the opportunity for significance gain
or personal incentive. (Kruglanski et al., 2014, p. 74) In fact, such humiliations can
provide motivation for suicide terrorism, as well: “Hopelessness, deprivation, envy, and
humiliation make death, and paradise, seem more appealing.” (Post et al., 2009, p. 19)
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The quest for significance is a vital part of the process of radicalization, which, when
interrupted, could reduce the amount of terrorists produced.
A fundamental desire for meaning exists in all humans and terrorists often see
violent extremism as a way to achieve meaning and significance. When one does not
have a clearly defined purpose in life or a strong personal identity, they often turn to a
collective identity to provide them with some sort of reassurance of their self-worth. As
Taylor and Louis (2004) argue, “a clearly defined collective identity is a necessary
prerequisite for engaging in the process of defining a personal identity and, by extension,
personal (self-) esteem.” (p. 175) This collective identity can most often be found within
the context of culture and religion due to the fact that it impacts “every aspect of a
person’s life.” (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 174) Islamist extremist groups appeal to the
need for collective identity by specifically targeting youths who live in a world of “social
upheaval” with no real example of how to overcome their disadvantages and make a
successful life for themselves. (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 177) There are a number of
different categories of these seekers based on what exactly they are looking for, and
extremist groups, specifically al-Qaeda, have specific ways to target each.
Various Seekers and Their Quests
The first kind of seeker or genre of quest for significance involves someone who
is seeking revenge for the injustices he perceives as a result of society’s prejudices
against him. This “revenge seeker” is drawn to al-Qaeda’s hatred of the West, whom he
will blame for his misfortunes in life, even though he may not have ever had direct
contact with the West previously. (Venhaus, 2010, p. 9) Such hatred will lead a potential
extremist recruit to make generalizations that the West has no place for Muslims in its
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society and culture and that any failures in the seeker’s life are not his own fault, but that
of his new foreign enemy. (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 800) Sageman (2008b) describes
the evolution of this hatred for the West:
…since 2003, it has been all about the war in Iraq, which has become the focal
point of global moral outrage for Muslims all over the world. Along with the
humiliations of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, Iraq is monopolizing today's
conversations about Islam and the West. On a more local level, governments that
appear overly pro-American cause radicals to feel they are the victims of a larger
anti-Muslim conspiracy, bridging the perceived local and global attacks against
them. (p. 40)
Islamist extremist groups prey on this feeling of injustice and prejudice by presenting an
image of Western culture as selfish, wealthy, and discriminatory of people of Muslim
faith. (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 176) When one perceives that they are under threat, they
become open to radicalization from extremist groups that aim to conquer said threats.
Another kind of quest for significance involves the need for purpose and
recognition; Venhaus (2010) refers to this potential extremist as the “status seeker.” (p. 9)
While the revenge seeker is more commonly found in Middle Eastern societies, the status
seeker often originates from the West as an immigrant who is trying to assimilate or as a
member of the American Muslim minority: “In ethnically divided Western communities,
these young men find few fellow countrymen who have achieved high status, and they
begin to perceive that prejudice and persecution is preventing their entire group from
improving its lot.” (Venhaus, 2010, p. 10) Groups like al-Qaeda prey on this
psychological need for acceptance by maintaining their fame and perceived success to
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convince the status seeker that “the surest route to respect is to join the global jihad.”
(Venhaus, 2010, p. 10)
The “identity seeker,” on the other hand, aims not to prove their worth to others,
but to themselves. An innate need for belonging and collective identity is arguably the
strongest pull to join a group, and if no other legitimate alternatives are presented, groups
like al-Qaeda appear a logical choice for the identity seeker. (Venhaus, 2010, p. 10)
Similar to gang violence, offering strong examples of healthy group relationships is key
to preventing the identity seeker from becoming interested in violent extremism.
However, as is often the case with impoverished urban youths, many young men and
women in Islamic societies never have the opportunity to form a collective identity that
provides them with stability and direction:
Who are particularly vulnerable in terms of a confused collective identity?
…young people who are future oriented, who are anxious to get ahead but have
no clear collective identity to provide them with the mechanisms and
infrastructure for defining themselves, promoting a positive identity, and
achieving their goals. (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 177)
Since terrorist organizations present a clearly defined collective identity in order to
indoctrinate their members to the cause and discourage any deviation from their goals,
young people are more likely to join because of the simplistic nature of this identity and
the enduring promise of rewards from group superiors. Their personal identity becomes
irrelevant and the collective identity takes precedence; because the identity seekers has a
weak sense of self, they are more easily persuaded to adopt a new one.(Taylor & Louis,
2004, p. 180)
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The final type of seeker that embarks of the quest for significance is the least
common of them all- the “thrill seeker.” Venhaus (2010) states that the thrill seeker tends
to come from a middle- to upper-class family, is unsatisfied with his current employment,
and “wants to prove his manhood by accomplishing an arduous task or surviving a
harrowing adventure.” (p. 11) Groups like al-Qaeda successfully prey upon the thrill
seeker’s need for adventure by presenting itself as an exciting and violent path through
life. However, new al-Qaeda recruits rarely see battle at first; they are often subjected to
simple tasks, such as providing transportation and meals to other members of the group.
(Venhaus, 2010, p. 11)
The various psychological needs and their respective seekers elicit a variety of
responses from Islamist extremist groups attempting to gain new members. If factors
such as the desire for community, identity, and purpose are what prompt someone to
interact with an extremist group, the way in which the extremist group responds seems to
be equally as important. Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) proposes a four-step process to
explain the phenomenon of radicalization:
1) cognitive opening—an individual becomes receptive to the possibility of new
ideas and worldviews
2) religious seeking—the individual seeks meaning through a religious idiom
3) frame alignment—the public representation proffered by the radical group
“makes sense” to the seeker and attracts his or her initial interest
4) socialization—the individual experiences religious lessons and activities that
facilitate indoctrination, identity-construction, and value changes (p.1)
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The “cognitive opening” step takes place when an individual’s quest for significance is
awakened, as previously discussed. The “religious seeking” step occurs when an
individual views their religion as an appropriate vehicle by which to develop their new
collective identity; they identify as a Muslim and trust the information that other Muslims
offer them. “Frame alignment” is what we can designate as the most important step of the
process of radicalization because it is the step that connects what the seeker desires with
what the extremist group can offer; the group’s message fits with the seeker’s Muslim
identity. “Socialization” further enforces the identity of the group upon the individual,
enabling them to meet their psychological needs by participation; the seeker feels he has
to defend Muslims by responding to the injustices committed against them. Simply put,
“the movement’s schemata must resonate with an individual’s own interpretive
framework to facilitate participation.” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 5)
Appealing to the Need for Collective Identity
As Taylor and Louis (2004) discuss at length in their article, “Terrorism and the
Quest for Identity,” the unique trait of salafi jihadi groups like al Qaeda is that they
successfully utilize the need for collective identity among new members, making
recruitment a relatively easy process. Leaders of these groups focus on youths in their
communities who do not have a strong sense of direction in their lives:
These young people find themselves at a time in their life when they are looking
to the future with the hope of engaging in meaningful behavior that will be
satisfying and get them ahead. Their objective circumstances including
opportunities for advancement are virtually nonexistent; they find some direction
from their religious collective identity but the desperately disadvantaged state of
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their community leaves them feeling marginalized and lost without a clearly
defined collective identity. (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p.178)
The authors cite refugees as an example of disadvantaged youths that are prime
candidates for recruitment to terrorist organizations. When one enters a refugee camp, it
is because they have left their home country for some reason; they seek asylum in a
country that will not persecute them for their religious or other affiliations and can
potentially offer them a higher standard of living. As such, these refugees sometimes
leave the collective identity that they associate with their country behind. This creates an
opportunity for groups like al Qaeda to offer a collective identity to those who “may not
be in a position to generate a collective identity on their own.” (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p.
179) Often, the one remaining piece of their collective identity is their religion; by
focusing on that characteristic, extremist groups are able to foster a feeling of
community, which allows them to frame their mission around the Muslim faith. It is
important to note, however, that not all refugees reject their previous collective identity;
some “cling to the collective identity they know, even when that collective identity is not
serving them well.” (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 179) It is mostly youths that are
susceptible to this kind of influence from extremist groups. It is also youths who are most
likely to engage in social networking, another tool that extremist groups use to procure
new members.
Socialization among Salafi Jihadi Extremists
In the age of modern technology, socialization among Islamist extremists and
terrorists has achieved a new ease of access and has reached a wider group than previous
face-to-face interactions were able to provide. The Internet, with its endless array of chat
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rooms, blogs, social networking websites, and email servers, provides perhaps the biggest
asset to groups like al Qaeda. In fact, scholars have found that reading a “properly
worded Twitter message can release as much oxytocin (a hormone critical to bonding and
trust) as seeing a loved one walk into a room.” (Helfstein, 2012, p. 24) Al Qaeda is able
to utilize modern communications, including the 24-hour news cycle and Internet sites,
which distinguishes their success from previous movements in history. (Venhaus, 2010,
p. 6)
These technologies facilitate the process of “socialization,” which Wiktorowicz
(2004) says “is intended to alter the values of the individual so that self-interest is defined
in accordance with the goals and beliefs of the movement ideology.” (p. 10) Socialization
among jihadi extremists can also be described as a “feedback loop,” in which members
communicate with new recruits and become more invested in their cause. Reaching out to
new members via modern social networks “ties the members’ identity even closer to the
movement.” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 11) In other words:
The escalation to high risk activism is a circular process whereby participation
increases association with the activist network, in turn deepening ideological
socialization, further fostering an ideological identity and ultimately increasing
the likelihood of high risk activism. (Helfstein, 2012, p. 11)
Interaction among higher-ranking members and new recruits to these movements is
mandatory in some groups. For example, Al Muhajiroun, a radical British organization in
support of violent Salafism, requires that members hold an “open public circle” or
discussion in order to “create a profile for the movement, create public awareness about
the vital issues, and make new contacts.” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 21) Exchanges between
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various members of a radical group and others in their social circle take place on a
regular basis, as highlighted by various training manuals from various organizations.
Socialization is of very high value among Islamist extremist organizations, suggesting
that it should be utilized in counterterrorism strategies. Possible strategies will be
outlined in the next section.
Policy Implications and Prevention Techniques
If the quest for significance, group dynamics, and propaganda from extremist
groups influence the process of radicalization, any attempt to prevent terrorism must be
structured around these themes. Analyzing the results of their research, scholars suggest
various methods of prevention that involve interrupting strong group relationships to
eventually break apart terrorist organizations. The quest for significance can be altered to
focus on morally acceptable goals that are not achieved through violence, which can be
accomplished through the process of deradicalization. Kruglanski et al. (2014) define
deradicalization as “a decreased commitment to the ideological goal, accompanied by a
resurgence of alternative pursuits and objectives.” (p. 87) Deradicalization involves the
reassignment of one’s belief system, while disengagement refers to the “discontinuation
of active participation in violence.” (p. 87) It is important to distinguish between these
two terms because someone may be disengaged with terrorist activity (for reasons
ranging from injury to being reassigned to a less hands-on role within the organization),
but still have a radical belief system. Someone who is disengaged but not deradicalized
may still partake in violent extremism in the future as they still think it is a morally
acceptable means to an end.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM AND RADICALIZATION 25

In addition to deradicalization and the interruption of the quest for significance,
scholars link group psychology to being the most successful tool in counterterrorism
strategies. Groups have an uncanny ability to influence their members by utilizing
popularity and threats of exclusion to manipulate one’s actions. Often, terrorists identify
more as members of their given organization than as individuals with a distinct sense of
self. Post (2010) states that “terrorists have subordinated their individual identity to the
collective identity, so that what serves the group, organization, or network is of primary
importance.” (p. 16) Therefore, by challenging the collective identity of the group,
terrorist cells will break down and not be viewed as legitimate, functioning organizations.
Post (2010) addresses the process of utilizing group dynamics as a counterterrorism
strategy and lists the steps needed to be successful:
1. “Inhibit” potential terrorists from joining terrorist groups and organizations;
2. “Produce dissention” within the groups;
3. “Facilitate exit” from the groups; and
4. “Reduce support” for the groups and “Delegitimize” their leaders (p. 23)
By creating doubt among group members, conflict between them will inevitably occur,
resulting in the breakdown of faith in leaders, reduced support for terrorist cells, and the
overall decline in terrorist activity.
Another possible method of combating the rise and radicalization of salafi jihadi
extremists is to attempt to disprove the propaganda that is presented by terrorist groups.
As previously mentioned, modern technology is an incredibly valuable asset to groups
like al Qaeda. If terrorist groups can utilize these technological advances to further their
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cause, why can counterterrorism not use the same techniques to their advantage? As
Horgan (2008) proposes
The mass media, both journalistic and popular, has an underdeveloped but
potentially significant role to play in contributing to the environment in which
terrorism thrives and simultaneously in which the attraction to involvement in
terrorism may be undermined. Challenges to the myths and lures of terrorism
probably can be an effective counterterrorist strategy for both the group and the
individual, but they can only be realistic and meaningful if they are directed at
specific populations. (p. 91)
Since propaganda is only effective if the issuer is seen as legitimate and reliable,
discrediting terrorist groups’ messages may be the key to reducing the number of new
recruits they are able to radicalize. Demonstrating the devastation that involvement in a
violent terrorist campaign can bring not only to the group’s members, but to their families
and friends, may challenge the notion that terrorism is a legitimate means to an end. This
has already been utilized in Saudi Arabia, where a rehabilitation program suggests “that
counterpropaganda may effectively challenge the extremist beliefs of imprisoned
jihadists and their sympathizers.” (Horgan, 2008, p. 92) Employing reliable, trustworthy
source of accurate information, such as respected Muslim clerics, may hold the answer to
distinguishing between the real messages of Islam and the messages that Islamist
extremist groups project, as Venhaus (2010) suggests: “If reeducation through religious
teaching can cause a fighter to renounce al-Qaeda, it stands to reason that religious
education programs conducted with younger participants could inoculate them against the
appeal of al-Qaeda.” (p. 12) Further efforts must be made to continue this kind of work
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and in turn, diminish the effectiveness of terrorist organizations and their methods of
communication.
Conclusions: Toward a Terrorism-Free World
Through careful research and consideration, it can be concluded that the manner
in which terrorist organizations communicate with their recruits, via propaganda,
framing, and the exploitation of psychological needs, is the most influential variable in
creating salafi jihadi extremists and terrorists. While this paper aims to focus on salafi
jihadi extremists, this hypothesis can be applied to other branches of terrorism and may
serve as a model for other counterterrorism techniques. While minor episodes of
depression and anxiety are common among many terrorists, as they are among the
general population, there is little evidence supporting the claim that severe mental illness
is a predisposing factor to becoming a radicalized extremist. Intensive screening
processes conducted by terrorist organizations eliminate potential recruits with
psychological disturbances, as they present a major security risk to the group. However,
psychological factors still play a major role in determining the success and prevalence of
terrorism. Group dynamics, pressure from peers, fear of isolation, and the quest for
significance all influence one to use violent extremism as a way of accomplishing their
political goals. Counterterrorism, therefore, must focus on breaking down group and
social relationships that reinforce radicalized and sometimes, cultural, beliefs that
terrorism is morally permissible. Further research must take on an interdisciplinary
approach that utilizes a combination of psychological trends and cultural observations to
ultimately bring about the downfall of terrorism as a legitimate approach to politics and
international relations.
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